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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved great success in solving a variety
of machine learning (ML) problems, especially in the domain of image recog-
nition. However, recent research showed that DNNs can be highly vulnerable
to adversarially generated instances, which look seemingly normal to human
observers, but completely confuse DNNs. These adversarial samples are crafted
by adding small perturbations to normal, benign images. Such perturbations,
while imperceptible to the human eye, are picked up by DNNs and cause them
to misclassify the manipulated instances with high confidence. In this work,
we explore and demonstrate how systematic JPEG compression can work as an
effective pre-processing step in the classification pipeline to counter adversarial
attacks and dramatically reduce their effects (e.g., Fast Gradient Sign Method,
DeepFool). An important component of JPEG compression is its ability to re-
move high frequency signal components, inside square blocks of an image. Such
an operation is equivalent to selective blurring of the image, helping remove
additive perturbations. Further, we propose an ensemble-based technique that
can be constructed quickly from a given well-performing DNN, and empirically
show how such an ensemble that leverages JPEG compression can protect a
model from multiple types of adversarial attacks, without requiring knowledge
about the model.
1 Introduction
Over the past few years, deep neural networks have achieved huge success in
many important applications. Computer vision, in particular, enjoys some of
the biggest improvement over traditional methods [11]. As the DNN models
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become more powerful, people tend to do less data pre-processing or manual
feature engineering, and prefer so-called end-to-end learning. For example, in-
stead of manual feature normalization or standardization, one can add batch
normalization layers and learn the best way to do it from the data distribu-
tion [9]. Image denoising can also be performed by stacking a DNN on top of
an auto-encoder [6].
However, recent research has shown serious potential vulnerability in DNN mod-
els [24], which demonstrates that adding some small and human-imperceptible
perturbations on an image can mislead the prediction of a DNN model to some
arbitrary class. These perturbations can be computed by using the gradient
information of a DNN model, which guides the direction in the input space that
will most drastically change the model outputs [4, 21]. To make the vulnerability
even more troubling, it is possible to compute a single “universal” perturbation
that can be applied to any images and mislead the classification results of the
model [17]. Also, one can perform black-box attacks without knowing the exact
DNN model being used [19].
Many defense methods have been proposed to counteract the adversarial at-
tacks. A common way is to design new network architectures or optimization
techniques [6, 4]. However, finding a good network architecture and hyperpa-
rameters for a particular dataset can be hard, and the resulting model may only
be resistant to certain kind of attacks.
1.1 Our Contributions
In this work, we propose to use JPEG compression as a simple and effective
pre-processing step to remove adversarial noise. Our intuition is that as ad-
versarial noises are often indiscernible by the human eye, JPEG compression
— designed to selectively discard information unnoticeable to humans — have
strong potential in combating such manipulations.
Our approach has multiple desired advantages. First, JPEG is a widely-used
encoding technique and many images are already stored in the JPEG format.
Most operating systems also have built-in support to encode and decode JPEG
images, so even non-expert users can easily apply this pre-processing step. Sec-
ond, this approach does not require knowledge about the model nor the attack,
and can be applied to a wide range of image datasets.
This work presents the following contributions:
• A pre-processing step to neural network image classifiers that uses JPEG
compression to remove adversarial noise from a given dataset.
• Empirical tests on two datasets, CIFAR-10 and GTSRB, that systemat-
ically studies how varying JPEG compression qualities affects prediction
accuracy.
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Figure 1: A comparison of the classification results of an exemplar image from
the German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) dataset. A benign
image (left) is originally classified as a stop sign, but after the addition of an
adversarial perturbation to the image (middle) the resulting image is classified
as a max speed 100 sign. Using JPEG compression on the adversarial image
(right), we recover the original classification of stop sign.
• Results showing the effect of including various amount of JPEG com-
pressed images in the training process. We find that this significantly
boosts accuracies on adversarial images and does not hurt the performance
on benign images.
2 Background
In this section, we discuss existing adversarial attack algorithms and defense
mechanisms. We then give a brief overview of JPEG compression, which plays
a crucial role in our defense approach.
2.1 Adversarial Attacks
Consider the scenario where a trained machine learning classifier C is deployed.
An attacker, assumed to have full knowledge of the classifier C, tries to compute
a small distortion δx for some test example x such that the perturbed example
x′ = x + δx is misclassified by the model, i.e., C(x′) 6= C(x). Prior work has
shown that even if the machine learning model is unknown, one can train a
substitute model and use it to compute the perturbation. This approach is very
effective in practice when both the target model and the substitute model are
deep neural networks, due to the property of transferability [24, 19].
The seminal work by Szegedy et al. [24] proposed the first effective adversarial
attack on DNN image classifiers by solving a Box-constrained L-BFGS optimiza-
tion problem and showed that the computed perturbations to the images were
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indistinguishable to the human eye: a rather troublesome property for people
trying to identify adversarial images. This discovery has gained tremendous
interest, and many new attack algorithms have been invented [4, 18, 17, 21]
and applied to other domains such as malware detection [5, 7], sentiment anal-
ysis [22], and reinforcement learning [14, 8].
In this paper, we explore the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM ) [4] and the
DeepFool (DF ) [18] attack, each of which construct instance-specific perturba-
tions to confuse a given model. We choose the FGSM attack for our evaluation
since it is the most efficient approach in terms of computation time and the DF
attack because it computes minimal (i.e., highly unnoticeable) perturbations.
Since we plan to evaluate these attacks in a practical setting, we only con-
sider the parameters of these attacks that produce adversarial instances having
low pathology, i.e., the images are not obviously perceivable as having been
manipulated, as seen in the middle image in Figure 1. Below, we briefly review
the two attacks.
Fast Gradient Sign Method [4]. FGSM is a fast algorithm which computes
perturbations subject to an L∞ constraint. The perturbation is computed by
linearizing the loss function J ,
x′ = x+  · sign(∇Jx(θ, x, y))
where θ is the set of parameters of the model and y is the true label of the
instance. The parameter  controls the magnitude of the perturbation. Intu-
itively, this method uses the gradient of the loss function to determine in which
direction each pixel’s intensity should be changed to minimize the loss function,
and updates all pixels accordingly by a specific magnitude. It is important to
note here that FGSM was designed to be a computational fast attack rather
than an optimal attack. Therefore, it is not meant to produce minimal adver-
sarial perturbations.
DeepFool [18]. DF constructs an adversarial instance under an L2 constraint
by assuming the decision boundary to be hyperplanar. The authors leverage
this simplification to compute a minimal adversarial perturbation that results
in a sample that is close to the original instance but orthogonally cuts across the
nearest decision boundary. In this respect, DF is an untargeted attack. Since
the underlying assumption that the decision boundary is completely linear in
higher dimensions is an oversimplification of the actual case, DF keeps reiter-
ating until a true adversarial instance is found. The resulting perturbations
are harder for humans to detect compared to perturbations applied by other
techniques.
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2.2 Defense Mechanisms
Although making a DNN model completely immune to adversarial attacks is
still an open problem, there have been various attempts to mitigate the threat.
We summarize the approaches with four categories.
1. Detecting adversarial examples before performing classification.
Metzen et al. [16] propose to distinguish genuine examples from the adver-
sarially perturbed ones by augmenting deep neural networks with a small
“detector” subnetwork. Feinman et al. [3] use density estimates to detect
examples that lie far from the natural data manifold, and use Bayesian
uncertainty estimates to detect when examples lie in the low-confidence
regions.
2. Modifying network architecture. Deep Contractive Network [6] is
a generalization of the contractive autoencoder, which imposes a layer-
wise contractive penalty in a feed-forward neural network. This approxi-
mately minimizes the network outputs variance with respect to perturba-
tions in the inputs. Dense Associative Memory model [12] tries to enforce
higher order interactions between neurons by changing rectified linear unit
(ReLU) to rectified polynomials. The idea is inspired by the hypothesis
that adversarial examples are caused by high-dimensional linearity of DNN
models.
3. Modifying the training process. The most common and straight-
forward approach is to directly use adversarial examples to augment the
training set. However, this is computationally expensive. Goodfellow et
al. [4] simulate this process in a more efficient way by using a modified
loss function that takes a perturbed example into account. Papernot et
al. [20] use the distillation method that uses the soft outputs of the first
model as labels to train a second model.
4. Pre-processing input examples to remove adversarial perturba-
tion. A major advantage of this approach is that it can be used with
any machine learning model, therefore it can be used alongside any other
method described above. Bhagoji et al. [1] apply principal component
analysis on images to reduce dimension and discard noise. Luo et al. [15]
propose to use a foveation-based mechanism that applies a DNN model on
a certain region of an image and discards information from other regions.
Our work belongs to this category. Prior works most relevant to our
proposed method are [2] and [13], both of which include JPEG compres-
sion as their defense mechanism. However, previous work did not focus
on how JPEG compression may be systematically leveraged as a defense
mechanism. For example, [2] only studied JPEG compression with quality
75 and had not evaluated how varying the amount of compression would
affect performance. In this work, we conduct extensive study to under-
stand the compression approach’s capability.
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[13] tried pre-processing techniques besides JPEG compression, such as
printing out adversarial images and taking pictures of them using a cell
phone, changing contrast, and adding Gaussian noise. However, they only
processed the images during the testing phase. In contrast, we also con-
sider training our models with JPEG compressed images. We further show
that constructing an ensemble of the models obtained by training on im-
ages of different levels of compression quality can significantly boost the
success rates in recovering the correct answers in adversarial images.
2.3 JPEG compression
JPEG is a standard and widely-used image encoding and compression technique
consists of the following steps:
1. converting the given image from RGB to YCbCr color space: this is done
because the human visual system relies more on spatial content and acuity
than it does on color for interpretation. Converting the color space isolates
these components which are of more import.
2. performing spatial subsampling of the chrominance channels in the YCbCr
space: the human eye is much more sensitive to changes in luminance, and
downsampling the chrominance information does not affect the human
perception of the image very much.
3. transforming a blocked representation of the YCbCr spatial image data
to a frequency domain representation using Discrete Cosine Transform
(DCT): this step allows the JPEG algorithm to further compress the image
data as outlined in the next steps by computing DCT coefficients.
4. performing quantization of the blocked frequency domain data according
to a user defined quality factor: this is where the JPEG algorithm achieves
majority of the compression, at the expense of image quality. This step
suppresses higher frequencies more since these coefficients contribute less
to the human perception of the image.
3 Experimental setup
Experiments in this paper were conducted with convolutional neural networks
on two image datasets: the CIFAR-10 dataset [10], and the German Traffic
Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) dataset [23].
The CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 50,000 training examples and a test set of
10,000 examples with 10 classes. Each image in the dataset is of size 32 × 32
pixels. The GTSRB dataset has 43 classes with 39,209 training examples and
12,630 testing examples. The image sizes in this dataset vary between 15 × 15
to 250× 250 pixels. For our analysis, we rescale each image to 48× 48 pixels.
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For CIFAR-10, we use a convolutional neural network with 2 Conv-Conv-Pooling
blocks, having Conv layer filter depths of 32 and 64 respectively. The Conv and
Pooling filter size used are 3× 3 with a Pooling stride of 2, 2. This is followed
by a fully connected layer of 512 units that feeds into a softmax output layer of
10 classes. The same architecture is extended for the GTSRB dataset with an
additional Conv-Conv-Pooling block of filter depth 128 and a softmax output
layer of 43 classes. The Pooling filter size is made 2× 2.
Both model was trained for 400 epochs using categorical cross entropy loss
with dropout regularization. We used the Adam optimizer to find the best
weights. The final models obtained had testing accuracy of 82.88% and 97.83%
on CIFAR-10 and GTSRB respectively.
To measure the effectiveness of an adversarial attack, we use a metric that
we call the “misclassification success” rate. It is defined as the proportion of
instances which were correctly classified by the trained models and whose labels
were successfully flipped by the attack.
4 JPEG Compression as Defense
A core principle behind JPEG compression is based on the human psychovisual
system, which aims to suppress high frequency information like sharp transi-
tions in intensity and color hue using Discrete Cosine Transform. As adversar-
ial attacks often introduce perturbations that are not compatible with human
psychovisual awareness (hence these attacks are sometimes imperceptible to hu-
mans), and we believe JPEG compression has the potential to remove these
artifacts. Thus, we propose to use JPEG compression as a pre-processing step
before running an instance through the classification model. We demonstrate
how using JPEG compression reduces the mistakes a model makes on datasets
that have been adversarially manipulated.
4.1 Effect of JPEG Compression on Classification
Benign, everyday images lie in a very narrow manifold. An image with com-
pletely random pixel colors is highly unlikely to be perceived as natural by
human beings. However, the objective basis of classification models, like DNNs,
often are not aligned with such considerations. DNNs may be viewed as con-
structing decision boundaries that linearly separates the data in high dimen-
sional spaces. In doing so, these models assume that the subspaces of natural
images exist beyond the actual manifold. Adversarial attacks take advantage
of this by perturbing images just enough so that they cross over the decision
boundary of the model. However, this crossover does not guarantee that the
perturbed images would lie in the original narrow manifold. Indeed, perturbed
images could lie in artificially expanded subspaces where natural images would
7
Figure 2: Applying JPEG compression (dashed lines with symbols) can counter
FGSM and DeepFool attacks on the CIFAR-10 and GTSRB datasets, e.g.,
slightly compressing CIFAR-10 images dramatically lowers DeepFool ’s attack
success rate, indicated by the steep orange line (left plot). Φ means no com-
pression has been applied. Attacks can be further suppressed by “vaccinating”
a DNN model by training it with compressed images, and using an ensemble of
such models – our approach, discussed in Section 5, rectifies a great majority of
misclassification (indicated by the horizontal dashed lines).
not be found.
Since JPEG compression takes the human psychovisual system into account,
we pursue the hypothesis that the manifold in which JPEG images occur would
have some semblance with the manifold of naturally occurring images, and that
using JPEG compression as a pre-processing step during classification would
re-project any adversarially perturbed instances back onto this manifold.
To test our hypothesis, we applied JPEG compression to images from the
CIFAR-10 and GTSRB datasets, adversarially perturbed by FGSM and DF,
and varied the quality parameter of the JPEG algorithm. Figure 2 shows the
experiment results.
Overall, we observe that applying JPEG compression (dashed lines with sym-
bols) can counter FGSM and DeepFool attacks on the CIFAR-10 and GTSRB
datasets. Φ means no compression has been applied.
Increasing compression (decreasing image quality) generally leads to better re-
moval of the adversarial effect at first, but the benefit reaches an inflection point
where the success rate starts increasing again. Besides the adversarial perturba-
tion, this inflection may also be attributed to the artifacts introduced by JPEG
compression itself at lower image qualities, which confuses the model.
With CIFAR-10, we observe that slightly compressing its images dramatically
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lowers DeepFool ’s attack success rate, indicated by the steep orange line (left
plot). The steepest drops take place on applying JPEG compression of image
quality 100 on uncompressed images, introducing extremely little compression
in the frequency domain. Since the JPEG algorithm also performs downsam-
pling of the chrominance channel irrespective of the image quality, a hypothesis
that supports this observation may be that DF attacks the chrominance chan-
nel much more than the luminance channel in Y CbCr color space. Since DF
introduces a minimal perturbation, it is easily removed with JPEG compression.
4.2 Vaccinating Models by Training with JPEG Compressed
Images
Figure 3: Classification accuracies of each vaccinated model on the CIFAR-10
test set that has been compressed to a particular image quality. Each cluster
of bars represents the model performances when tested with images having the
corresponding image quality as indicated on the vertical axis. Within each
cluster, each bar represents a vaccinated model. Vertical red lines denote the
accuracy of the original, non-vaccinated model for that image quality.
Testing adversarial images with JPEG compression suggests that the algorithm
seems to be able to remove perturbations by re-projecting the images to the
manifold of JPEG images. Since our initial model was trained on the origi-
nal benign image dataset (without any adversarial manipulation), testing with
compressed images that have lower image quality unsurprisingly lead to higher
misclassification rates, likely due to artifacts introduced by the compression al-
gorithm itself. This can also be explained by the notion that the manifold of
9
Figure 4: Performance of the vaccinated models on adversarially constructed
test sets. Each line with a symbol represents a vaccinated model and the black
horizontal dotted line represents the accuracy of the original model under attack.
These results demonstrate that re-training with JPEG compressed images can
help recover from an adversarial attack.
JPEG compressed images of a particular image quality may be similar to that of
another quality, but not completely aligned. We now propose that with training
the model over this manifold corresponding to a particular image quality, the
model can potentially learn to classify images even in the presence of JPEG
artifacts. From the perspective of adversarial images, applying JPEG compres-
sion would remove the perturbations and re-training with compressed images
could help ensure that the model is not confused by the JPEG artifacts. We
call this approach of re-training the model with JPEG compressed images as
“vaccinating” the model against adversarial attacks.
We re-trained the model with images of JPEG qualities 100 through 20 (increas-
ing compression) with a step size of 10, and hence obtained 9 models (besides
the original model). We refer to each of these re-trained models as Mx, where
x corresponds to the image quality the model was re-trained with. The original
10
model is referred to as M .
While re-training, the weights of Mx were initialized with the weights of Mx+10
for faster convergence. For example, the weights of M80 were initialized with
weights of M90, and the weights of M100 were initialized with weights of M ,
and so on. The intuition for our approach was derived from the proposition
that the manifold of images corresponding to successive levels of compression
would exist co-locally, and the decision boundaries learned by the model would
not have to displace significantly to account for the new manifold. This means
that given any model, our approach can quickly generate new vaccinated models.
Figure 3 shows clear benefits of our vaccination idea — vaccinated models gener-
ally perform better than the original model on the CIFAR-10 test set, especially
at lower image qualities. For example, M20 performs the best for images with
quality 20 and worst for images with quality 100. Correspondingly, M100 per-
forms the best for images with quality 100 and worst for images with quality
20. The performance of M100 closely follows the performance of M across each
image quality. All these observations are consistent with our fundamental intu-
ition of JPEG manifolds coexisting in the same hyperlocality.
Figure 4 visualizes the performance of the vaccinated models on adversarially
perturbed datasets by varying the image quality it is tested on. Again, general
trends show that increasing JPEG compression removes adversarial perturba-
tions. We see that the effect of the adversarial attacks on M does get transferred
to the vaccinated models as well, but as the compression is increased on the im-
ages that the model is trained with, the transferability of the attack subsides.
An interesting thing to note here is that with CIFAR-10, the accuracy decreases
for lower image qualities. This means that the artifacts introduced by JPEG
may be taking over the adversarial attack to bring down the accuracy, which
may be attributed to the small image size of the CIFAR-10 dataset. We do
not see such a significant decrease in accuracy at lower image qualities with the
GTSRB dataset, which contains larger images.
5 Fortified Defense: an Ensemble of Models
If adversaries are able to gain access to the original model, they may also be able
to recreate the vaccinated models and attack them individually. To protect the
classification pipeline against such an attack, we propose to use an ensemble of
vaccinated models that vote on images with varying image qualities. Hence, in
our ensemble, the models M100 through M20 vote on a given image compressed
at image qualities of 100 through 20 with a step size of 10. This would yield 81
votes. The final label assigned to the sample is simply the label that got the
majority votes through this process.
Since each of the vaccinated models is trained on a different manifold of im-
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Figure 5: Accuracies of all models under consideration when each model is
individually attacked. The attack does get transferred to other models but is
mitigated with increasing JPEG compression.
ages, the ensemble essentially models separate subspaces of the data, and the
current attacks can only distort the samples in one of these subspaces. Hence,
no matter which model an adversary targets, the other models should make up
for the attack. Figure 5 illustrates this idea. A majority of the models are not
affected significantly irrespective of the model being attacked. Increasing JPEG
compression also protects the model being attacked to some extent. Even if the
perturbation introduced is very strong, training on different compression lev-
els help ensure that the decision boundaries learned by the vaccinated models
would be dissimilar, and the verdict of the models would be highly uncorrelated.
We present empirical results of the accuracies obtained with the original model
M in Table 1 for comparison with our ensemble approach, where M was tar-
geted with adversarial attacks and our approach was able to recover from the
attack by employing JPEG compression. Since the ensemble involves referring
to several models with varying compression levels applied to the instances be-
ing tested, a parallelized approach can also be undertaken to make the process
Table 1: Performance of our approach on the respective test sets as compared
to the scenario when original, non-vaccinated model is under attack.
Original scenario With our ensemble
CIFAR-10
Benign images 82.88% 83.19%
FGSM [=0.02] 28.97% 79.57%
DeepFool 27.44% 82.71%
GTSRB
Benign images 97.83% 98.59%
FGSM [=0.08] 41.00% 73.37%
DeepFool 68.19% 91.70%
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faster.
Note that we choose an arbitrary combination of image qualities for our analysis,
and more optimal combinations may exist. If an adversary gains access to a clas-
sifier model and is also aware of our scheme of protecting it using this ensemble
approach with vaccinated models, one can simply modify the scheme and opt
for a different combination of image qualities, which would yield a completely
different ensemble. Since our approach is built for faster convergence, the en-
semble can be constructed quickly while still retaining the network architecture
that works well for a given problem.
6 Conclusions
We have presented our preliminary empirical analysis of how systematic use of
JPEG compression, especially in ensembles, can counter adversarial attacks and
dramatically reduce their effects. In our ongoing work, we are evaluating our
approaches against more attack strategies and datasets.
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